





















































2014 was a year of transition and controversy in Europe:  a new Parlia -
ment and new Commission were constituted and Opinion 2/13 of the
Court of Justice of the European Union on the EU’s accession to the
European Convention on Human Rights raised serious questions about
the coherence and future character of the human rights protection
regimes in Europe. 
Across 38 contributions by 61 authors in five sections, the European
Yearbook on Human Rights 2015 explains and contextualizes key
 developments in human rights and provides much needed analysis.
Edited jointly by representatives of four major European human rights
research, teaching and training institutions, the Yearbook 2015 covers
political and legal developments in the field of the three main organi -
zations charged with securing human rights in Europe: EU, Council of
Europe and OSCE, accompanied by a chapter on cross-cutting topics.
Now in its seventh edition, the Yearbook remains essential reading for
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A Introduction 
No European standards apply directly to questions concerning the national iden-
tity of states that can include questions like the concept of the nation or ideologi-
cal references used in a constitution. If anything, the Treaty of the European 
Union (TEU) is based on respect of states sovereignty: according to Article 4 
para. 2, the EU shall respect the identity of member states. But the national 
identity of member states might cause legitimate concerns for domestic human 
rights protection, the rule of law and democracy which are protected by the Arti-
cle 2 of the TEU. There is no hierarchy between Article 4 para. 2 and the Article 2 
of the TEU.  
Nowadays, Hungary presents the most obvious case where all elements of 
constitutional democracy are threatened: checks and balances, fundamental 
rights, the rule of law – all protected under Article 2.1 This paper analyses 
                                 
*  The research leading to this paper has received funding from the European Com-
mission’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under the grant agree-
ment FRAME (Project No. 320000), www.fp7-frame.eu. 
1  See e.g. European Parliament Resolution of 10 March 2011 on Media Law in Hun-
gary, P7_TA(2011)0094; European Parliament Resolution of 16 February 2012 on the 
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through the example of the Hungarian Fundamental Law the conflict between the 
universal values of human rights and the particularistic national identity of the 
states. Even the importance of the universal human rights movement can be 
better understood if we one focus on examining illiberal, anti-democratic ideas 
that also influence constitution-making. It examines how an antiegalitarian ethnic 
concept of nation has been given primary role in the Hungarian Fundamental 
Law and how it leads to a constitutional tragedy.2 
B The Fundamental Law of Hungary 
In May 2010 the National Assembly of the Republic of Hungary accepted the 
government programme of the Fidesz-KDNP party alliance that obtained more 
than two-thirds of the seats in the parliamentary election.3 Shortly thereafter, in 
June 2010 the National Assembly approved the Declaration on National Cooper-
ation as a political document, in which it declared that “a new social contract was 
laid down in the April general elections through which the Hungarians decided to 
create a new system: the National Cooperation System”.4  
The Hungarian Parliament passed Hungary’s new constitution (entitled the 
Fundamental Law) on 18 April 2011, which entered into force on 1 January 2012 
and superseded the previous constitution (Constitution of 1989). The Fundamen-
tal Law and its five amendments were passed by the members of parliament 
belonging to the governing party alliance, without the support of the opposition 
parties. 
                                                              
Recent Political Developments in Hungary (2012/2511(RSP)), P7_TA(2012)0053; 
Council of Europe, Opinion of the Commissioner for Human Rights on Hungary’s 
Media Legislation in Light of Council of Europe Standards on Freedom of the Media 
(25 February 2011), CommDH (2011), 10; European Commission for Democracy 
through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion on the New Constitution of Hungary – 
Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 87th Plenary Session (Venice, 17-18 June 
2011), Strasbourg (20 June 2011), Opinion No. 618 (2011), Council of Europe 
2012), https://sites.google.com/site/amicusbrief hungary (accessed 12 December 
2014). (CDL-AD (2011) 016), para. 91 et seq. See also Gábor Attila Tóth (ed.), Con-
stitution for a Disunited Nation. On Hungary’s 2011 Fundamental Law, Central Euro-
pean University Press (2012); Miklós Bánkuti and others, Opinion on Hungary’s New 
Constitutional Order: Amicus Brief to the Venice Commission on the Transitional 
Provisions of the Fundamental Law and the Key Cardinal Laws, (Gábor Halmai and 
Kim Lane Scheppele (eds.) (2012)), https://sites.google.com/site/amicusbriefhungary 
(accessed 12 December 2014.) 
2  According to the definition given by Eskridge and Levinson, one can speak about 
constitutional tragedy if the flaws of the constitution itself threaten constitutional de-
mocracy. William N. Eskridge and Sanford Levinson (eds.), Constitutional Stupidi-
ties/Constitutional Tragedies (1998). 
3  See Gábor Halmai, An Illiberal Constitutional System in the Middle of Europe (2014), 
in: Wolfgang Benedek, Florence Benoît-Rohmer, Wolfram Karl, Matthias C. 
Kettemann and Manfred Nowak (eds.), European Yearbook of Human Rights 2014 
(2014), 512. 
4  Political Declaration 1 of 2010 (16 June 2010) of the Hungarian National Assembly 
on National Cooperation, http://www.kulugyminiszterium.hu/NR/rdonlyres/1EC78E 
E5-8A4B-499C-9BE5-E5FD5DC2C0A1/0/Political_Declaration.pdf (accessed 20 De-
cember 2014). 
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1 National Avowal 
The Fundamental Law is introduced by a lengthy preamble called National 
Avowal, which defines the characteristics of the legal order. It is in the preamble 
that the legislator defined the national identity of the political community.  
The constitutions of liberal democracies are founded on the acceptance of a 
pluralistic political community, the separation of church and state, the primary 
use of the concept of the political nation, and the assumption of the moral equali-
ty of citizens. These constitutions do not commit themselves to specific moral 
conceptions but intend to give everybody the possibility to live a good life by 
ensuring secular political values and freedoms that were mainly born in the period 
of the Enlightenment. The most serious charge against the preamble of the Fun-
damental Law is the absence of such values. Instead, starting from a moral 
approach it tries to form the constitutional identity of the country in a way that 
might lead to certain restriction of rights. The preamble provides a pre-modern 
list of non-neutral cohesive values such as fidelity, faith and love,5 belonging to 
Christian Church, belonging to the Hungarian ethnic nation while it does not 
mention, for instance, the principle of equality.6  
Although the republic remains to be the form of government, the Hungarian 
Holy Crown, appearing as the embodiment of national unity, retrieves some of its 
constitutional function. This is in compliance with the statement of the present 
Prime Minister made in 2006: ”the nation is the body, whereas the republic is only 
the clothes.”7 The preamble furthermore includes reference to “the achievements 
of our historical constitution”,8 which, however, unlike the Anglo-Saxon develop-
ment of constitutional law, does not point towards the continuous expansion of 
rights, since Hungarian legal history has been frequently halted by rights restricting 
dictatorial periods.  
National and ethnic minorities cannot participate in the creation of the consti-
tution. This is made clear in the very first sentence of the document which begins 
with the following: ”WE, THE MEMBERS OF THE HUNGARIAN NATION, at the 
beginning of the new millennium, with a sense of responsibility for every Hungarian, 
hereby proclaim the following.”9 The Preamble thus introduces an ethnic concept 
of the nation,10 especially when it goes on to explain that ”We promise to preserve 
                                 
5  Our fundamental cohesive values are fidelity, faith and love. (National Avowal) 
6  Kriszta Kovács, Equality: The Missing Link, in: Gábor Attila Tóth (ed.), Constitution 
for a Disunited Nation. On Hungary’s 2011 Fundamental Law, Central European 
University Press (2012), 186. 
7  Orbán Viktor a miniszterelnök-jelölt. Viktor Orbán is the candidate for prime minister 
(2006), http://2001-2006.orbanviktor.hu/hir.php?aktmenu=2&id=2447&printing=1 (ac-
cessed 13 November 2014). 
8  See to this Zoltán Szente, A historizáló alkotmányozás problémái – a történeti 
alkotmány és a Szent Korona az új Alaptörvényben (2011), 3 Közjogi Szemle 1, 
Zoltán Szente The doctrine of the Holy Crown in the Hungarian Historical Constitu-
tion, Journal on European History of Law 1 (2013) 4, 109. 
9  National Avowal (Fundamental Law). 
10  Opinion on Hungary’s New Constitutional Order: Amicus Brief to the Venice Com-
mission on the Transitional Provisions of the Fundamental Law and the Key Cardinal 
Laws (2014), 7, or Zsolt Körtvélyesi , From “We the People” To “We the Nation”, in: 
Gábor Attila Tóth (ed.), Constitution for a Disunited Nation Hungary’s New Funda-
mental Law (2012). 
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the intellectual and spiritual unity of our nation torn apart in the storms of the last 
century”.11 As János Kis points it out, the Fundamental Law defines the nation as 
a community, the binding fabric of which is “intellectual and spiritual”: not politi-
cal, but cultural. There is no place in this community for the national minorities 
living within the territory of the Hungarian state.12 
The sense of belonging to the nation does not extend in this constitution to all 
residents of the state. There is not a single reference to the political nation: the 
phrase “we the people” and the sense of identity expressed therein do not ap-
pear.13 It follows that members of recognized national minorities14 become sec-
ondary and other, non-ethnic Hungarians who do not form a national minority, 
such as Jews, become third-rate citizens; they are not equally part of the consti-
tutional power. According to the Fundamental Law national minorities only ”form 
part of the Hungarian political community and are constituent parts of the 
State”.15 (The former constitution also mentioned that national and ethnic minori-
ties ”participate in the sovereign power of the people”. The new text does not 
contain this provision.) This is even more problematic if we take into account that 
the Hungarian state is not even neutral in name and not all citizens may, regard-
less of identity, belong to the privileged nation. The state grants special minority 
rights as compensation to national minorities, in return for which it expects the 
loyalty of said groups. All of this makes it at least doubtful whether the state of 
the Hungarian ethnic nation follows the aspirations of those with non-Hungarian 
identity with equal attention and whether it grants them equal respect. Such 
regulation does not comply with the demand of moral equality.  
It was due to the appearance of the modern term of the nation that the mem-
bers of political communities became capable of seeing each other as equals. In 
contrast, the Fundamental Law has a clear anti-egalitarian character and institu-
tionalizes an antiegalitarian concept of the nation.16 It addresses only Hungarians 
(the ethnic nation), who thus constitute the subjects of the constitution, leading to 
the erosion of the theoretical basis of minority rights on which the former consti-
tution was based, namely the fundamental principles of the multi-cultural model.17 
According to the preamble ”Our Fundamental Law shall be the basis of our legal 
                                 
11  National Avowal (Fundamental Law). 
12  See Opinion on Hungary’s New Constitutional Order: Amicus Brief to the Venice 
Commission on the Transitional Provisions of the Fundamental Law and the Key 
Cardinal Laws, 7.  
13  See in detail Zsolt Körtvélyesi, From “We the People” To “We the Nation”, in: Gábor 
Attila Tóth (ed.), Constitution for a Disunited Nation Hungary’s New Fundamental 
Law (2012), 22. 
14  The following ethnic groups qualify by Act on nationalities as national minorities 
(nationalities) of Hungary: Bulgarian, Roma, Greek, Croatian, Polish, German, Ar-
menian, Romanian, Ruthenian, Serbian, Slovakian, Slovenian and Ukrainian. 
15  National Avowal (Fundamental Law). 
16  By anti-egalitarian nationalism I mean that pre-modernity form of nationalism that 
does not recognize or limits the opportunity for people to belong to the nation inde-
pendent of his/her group membership (i.e., material position, place of residence, 
origin). 
17  See e.g. Balázs Majtényi, What Has Happened to Our Model Child? The Creation 
and Evolution of the Hungarian Minority Act’, European Yearbook of Minority Issues 
6 (2005) 5, 397. 
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order: it shall be a covenant among Hungarians past, present and future”.18 
There are several possible interpretations of this provision. First, with the word 
‘covenant’ it invokes social contract theory. However, without saying why in the 
official explanation of the bill,19 the Fourth Amendment replaced ‘covenant’ 
(szerződés) with ‘alliance’ (szövetség). It is a step back from the concept of the 
social contract: in the Hungarian language, the word ‘szövetség’ has less of a 
legal than a symbolic meaning. Finally, it can also refer to the transcendent, non-
secular layer of contract, because in the Hungarian language the name of the 
Old and New Testaments are Ó and Új Szövetség. This interpretation is even 
more likely as the Preamble of the Constitution (National Avowal) links the nation 
to Christianity, stating that ”we recognise the role of Christianity in preserving 
nationhood” In this case, the most appropriate translation would be: the Funda-
mental Law is a testament ”among Hungarians past, present and future”.  
It should not be surprising that, as Küpper remarks, in the Hungarian constitution 
even sustainable development and environmental protection gain a national 
character: Article P (Basic Provisions, Part entitled “Foundation”) declares that 
“all natural resources […] form part of the nation’s common heritage”.20 Or, for 
instance, the National Avowal mentions that ”we commit to promoting and safe-
guarding our heritage [...] along with all man-made and natural assets of the 
Carpathian Basin”’. (The Carpathian Mountains bordered Hungary before the 
Trianon Treaty 1920.) 
The National Avowal also declares that ”we believe that our children and 
grandchildren will make Hungary great again with their talent, persistence and 
moral strength”.21 The wording of the provision is highly problematic because it 
invokes the historical “greatness”, i.e. greatness in size, of the country: it might 
be understood as referring to an intention of territorial revision, in particular the 
revision of the post-World War I Treaty of Trianon, where Hungary lost two-thirds 
of its territory and three-fifths of its population. The size of the population lost 
was 10,6 million of which the number of ethnic Hungarians was 3,5 million (today 
it is less than 2,2 million). Reference to the Holy Crown confirms this interpreta-
tion as it has traditionally been a unifying symbol for territories outside the cur-
rent borders of Hungary. If we interpret this sentence together with other consti-
tutional provisions though, the revisionist connotation fortunately fades; it might 
also refer to politics that serve, for instance, the improvement of the scientific or 
athletic importance of Hungary. Still, since the provision in this form is subject to 
misunderstanding, it would be better if the legislator annulled it. 
                                 
18  The Fundamental Law’s preamble is entitled National Avowal. For the official English 
translation of the Fundamental Law, http://www.parlament.hu/angol/the_fundamental_ 
law_of_hungary_consolidated_interim.pdf (accessed 13 November 2014). 
19  See the official interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, Indokolás (Justification), 
http://www.parlament.hu/irom39/09929/09929.pdf (accessed 13 November 2014). 
20  Herbert Küpper, Hol vagyok én a szövegben? [Where am I in the text?], in: Benedek 
Molnár, Márton Németh and Péter Tóth (eds.), Mérlegen az Alaptörvény – Interjúkö-
tet hazánk új alkotmányáról (2013) 89. 
21  National Avowal (Fundamental Law). 
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2 Introductory Provisions – The Chapter Entitled 
“Foundations” 
Article A of the introductory provisions of the Chapter “Foundations” changed the 
name of the state from the Republic of Hungary to Hungary, thus emphasizing 
the decreasing role attributed to the republic as a form of government in compar-
ison to the former constitution.  
Article L para. (1) protects the family as the basis of the ‘nation’s survival’. 
Family as understood in the constitution is based on marriage between a man 
and a woman and the relationship between parents and children. The provision 
has the potential to restrict women’s autonomy, the rights of sexual minorities 
and the rights of childless couples.  
Article R para. (3) of the Foundations endows the preamble with a normative 
character and it refers to the historical constitution when it declares that “the 
provisions of the Fundamental Law shall be interpreted in accordance with their 
purposes, the National Avowal contained therein and the achievements of our 
historical constitution”. Reference to the historical constitution of itself endangers 
legal certainty as in Hungary the content of the historical constitution and its 
relationship with the written constitution is disputable. Reference to the National 
Avowal also involves dangers. According to the Dworkinian teleological interpre-
tation there is always a moral conviction underlying a constitution, on which 
those interpreting and applying the law continuously rely.22 Relying on an inter-
pretation that follows from the values included in the National Avowal (such as 
fidelity, faith and love, belonging to Christian Church, belonging to the Hungarian 
ethnic nation) might, however, lead to a restriction of rights not acceptable in 
constitutional democracies. Principles laid down in the Avowal shall be the moral 
basis and foundation of the legal order, therefore they can be invoked in the case 
of legislative gaps and dispute.  
Article U para. (1) mentions the “form of government based on the rule of law, 
established in accordance with the will of the nation” Subpara. a) further on 
claims that “the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party and its legal predecessors 
and other political organisations established to serve them in the spirit of com-
munist ideology were criminal organisations […] and betraying the nation”. With 
the intention to restrict the rights of political opponents, the provision might vio-
late the principle of nullum crimen sine lege, therefore the principle of the prohibi-
tion of retroactivity, furthermore the possibility of conducting a procedure at an 
inappropriate time might lead to the violation of the right to a fair trial. The rule of 
law concept of the EU is administered by an independent judiciary and right to a 
fair trial. The provision itself is very similar to Robespierre’s concept that the 
nation’s will is expressed in law, which can be derived from Rousseau’s ‘general 
will’.23 According to Jacobin ideology ”the state represents the people’s will, and 
the existence of plural institutions and social forces only fragments that will”.24 In 
the Hungarian Constitutional regulation the ‘general will’ appears as the ethnic 
nation’s will. (In contrast to this, the general will meant the political nation’s will 
for the Jacobins. In the Jacobin political concept of nation “state and nation, and 
                                 
22  Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986). 
23  Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (1968), Book 2, section 6. 
24  William Safran, Pluralism and Multiculturalism in France: Post-Jacobin Transfor-
mations, Political Science Quarterly 3 (2003) 118, 439. 
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citizenship and nationality are congruent”.)25 In addition to this Article, the “will of 
the nation” also appears in the preamble, which states that “our Fundamental 
Law shall be the basis of our legal order: it […] expresses the nation’s will”. That 
is, under Article U para. (1) read in conjunction with the preamble, in the name of 
the “nation’s will” the government can limit human rights, for instance the rights 
of their political opponents who ‘betray’ the nation. Under Article U, the Hungari-
an Socialist Workers’ Party, its legal predecessors and other political organiza-
tions are the enemies of the nation in the Jacobin sense. Arguably, it is not the 
ideology that is common between Jacobins and the present Hungarian govern-
ment, but rather the way they exercise power and the assumption that the laws 
express the nation’s will.  
3 The Chapter on Fundamental Rights and Obligations: 
Freedom and Responsibility 
In this section, the study will outline what impact the new constitutional identity of 
the state might have on human rights protection. When states reject the applica-
tion of international and European human rights standards, they usually refer to 
the protection of constitutional values.26 The theoretical curiosity of the Hungarian 
Fundamental Law is that it combines the term ‘nation’ with the aforementioned 
pre-modern constitutional values which in turn determine who belong to the 
ethnic nation. If human rights are interpreted with reference to pre-modern val-
ues, in practice it might result in human rights limitations. 
The Fundamental Law reflects an intention not to stay neutral in respect of 
the life and ideology of citizens, and besides their rights it emphasizes their obli-
gations and responsibilities, thereby narrowing down possible choices and guiding 
citizens towards the moral conviction and way of life deemed to be right by the 
legislator.27 The new constitutional concept of the nation in Hungary can serve as 
a basis of human rights limitations and divides the political community. It means 
that members of minorities (ethnic, sexual, political, social and other) become, in 
principle, secondary citizens; they are not part (national minorities)28 or not equal 
part (other minorities, such as sexual minorities) of the ‘we’ (the ethnic nation) in 
whose name the constitution was adopted.  
In the spirit of the 1989 Constitution, the Hungarian Constitutional Court exer-
cised a moral reading29 of the constitution, putting the right to human dignity on 
the top of the hierarchy of human rights, and connecting it with equality or “the 
right to equal dignity constituted the basis of the most important decisions”.30 The 
                                 
25  Ibid., 465. 
26  See, e.g. Anne Peters, Supremacy Lost: International Law Meets Domestic Constitu-
tional Law, Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law 3 (2009) 3, 170. 
27  Tamás Győrfi, Jogok az új alkotmánykoncepcióban [Rights in the Conception of the 
Constitution] (2011), http://szuveren.hu/vendeglap/gyorfi-tamas/jogok-az-uj-alkotmany 
koncepcioban (accessed 13 November 2014). 
28  Named nationalities in the text of the Fundamental Law. 
29  Ronald Dworkin, The Moral Reading of the Constitution (1996), www.nybooks.com/ 
articles/archives/1996/mar/21/the-moral-reading-of-the-constitution (accessed 13 No-
vember 2014).  
30  László Sólyom, The Role of Constitutional Courts in the Transition to Democracy 
with Special Reference to Hungary, International Sociology 1 (2003) 18, 133. 
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moral concept behind human rights is based on personal autonomy, freedom 
and equality. The former Constitutional Court’s understanding of equality was 
based on Dworkin’s theory of equality of resources.31 The Court underlined that 
everybody must be treated as persons with equal dignity. The Court defined the 
general equality rule “according to which the law should treat every person with 
equal respect”.32 This required that all members of society must have equal 
human rights.  
The text of the Fundamental Law no longer supports the former moral read-
ing33 of the Constitution, which was based on personal autonomy, freedom and 
equality.34 (And it clearly differs from the EU’s concept on dignity and equality).35 
This in itself can restrict the use of the previous decisions of the Hungarian Con-
stitutional Court. Additionally, the Fourth Amendment adopted in 2013 effectively 
annuls all Court decisions prior to the entry into force of the Fundamental Law, 
stating that “Constitutional Court rulings given prior to the entry into force of the 
Fundamental Law are hereby repealed. This provision is without prejudice to the 
legal effect produced by those rulings”.36  
Article II ensures the right to life and the right to human dignity. The declara-
tion that “the life of the foetus shall be protected from the moment of conception” 
and the provision that “every human being shall have the right to life’ is included 
in one sentence, which might later on serve as a basis for acknowledging the 
foetus” right to life by the Constitutional Court.  
In Hungary one can observe a process whereby extreme right-wing discours-
es on Roma minority have become increasingly mainstream, given that an ever 
wider swath of society relates to these discourses.37 The Fundamental Law has 
provisions that are explicitly against the Roma minority and support the main-
streaming of these prejudice discourses.38 For instance Article V ensures the 
following:39 ”Everyone shall have the right to repel any unlawful attack against 
his or her person or property, or one that poses a direct threat to the same, as 
provided for by an Act.” The article is denounced for protecting the ethnic Hun-
garian middle class from the socially excluded (among whom Roma are 
overrepresented). As Kovács points out, “this article is about a right to self-
defence in a state of nature described by Hobbes, and not a basic right in a 
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constitutional state”.40 This constitutional provision contributes to a violent cli-
mate and it is an indirect form of discrimination against socially marginalized 
groups. 
By virtue of Article VII the state can differentiate between churches and other 
religious organizations and the state shall cooperate to promote community goals 
only with churches.41 Since the term “ethnic nation” is linked to Christianity,42 dis-
criminatory legislation and practices can follow. The application of this new rule 
can lead to the end of the freedom to establish new churches in Hungary.  
Under Article 36 of the Fundamental Law: “The right to freedom of speech 
may not be exercised with the aim of violating the dignity of the Hungarian na-
tion.” In the European tradition human dignity is linked to the individual, not the 
community. Human dignity “generally protects the individual personality”, not the 
dignity of the community, and especially not that the majority community.43 The 
parliamentary majority restricts more and more the term ‘nation’ according to its 
political interests. One is concerned that the above amendment will be an effec-
tive tool to prohibit criticism against the government. Since the parliamentary 
majority exercises constitutional power in the name of the ethnic nation, criticism 
of the Fourth Amendment might amount to a violation of the dignity of the Hun-
garian nation.  
As part of the right to work Article XII stipulates the obligation to work accord-
ing to one’s abilities and possibilities: “Everyone shall be obliged to contribute to 
the enrichment of the community through his or her work, in accordance with his 
or her abilities and possibilities.” Like Article V, this provision has the potential to 
be directed against the Roma community, which is the biggest minority in Hungary 
afflicted by unfavorable social conditions and widespread prejudices. The provi-
sion removes those fundamental rights guarantees that prevent the introduction 
of measures which bind the provision of unemployment aid to work or to activity 
deemed to be socially useful.  
The Fundamental Law authorizes the legislator to punish homelessness44 as 
part of the right to adequate housing. Article XXII para. (1) stipulates the right to 
housing, stating that “Hungary shall strive to ensure decent housing conditions and 
access to public services for everyone.” And as part of the same right, para. (3) 
further establishes that “in order to protect public order, public security, public 
health and cultural values, an Act of Parliament or a local ordinance may declare 
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illegal staying in a public area as a permanent abode with respect to a specific 
part of such public area”. The limitation of the rights of homeless people particu-
larly reinforces the anti-egalitarian character of the Fundamental Law. According 
to the paragraph above, the rights of homeless people may be restricted by law 
in order to protect some social values, in particular “public order, public security, 
public health and cultural values”. It should be underlined that it is highly unusual 
to restrict a fundamental right in order to protect ‘cultural values’.45 The human 
dignity of the individual, which stands at the pinnacle of human rights protection, 
cannot be limited in the name of cultural values. Moreover, the law has a discrim-
inatory impact on those living in poverty and belonging to disadvantaged social 
groups. It also misinterprets the right to housing. Since Article XXII goes against 
the former moral concept behind human rights protection, it violates internation-
ally protected human rights (e.g., right to dignity, right to housing). According to 
the legislator, the rights of those who do not live according to the declared values 
of the imagined ethnic nation (e.g., homeless people) will be restricted. 
It is an often cited viewpoint that the archetypal liberal subject of human rights 
protection was the “white Christian male propertied citizen”,46 or, more generally, 
somebody who did not belong to a vulnerable group. Therefore nowadays inter-
national and European law, as well as constitutional democracies attempt to 
compensate vulnerable subjects and take measures to achieve the equality of 
these groups. One of the main questions is “how to take into account the position 
of vulnerable groups”47 in the frame of human rights protection, i.e. how human 
rights protection can grapple with not only the formal but also the substantive 
concepts of equality. Against this trend the Hungarian illiberal constitution does 
not take into account the substantive, let alone the formal concepts of equality 
and it has a clear anti-egalitarian character.48  
4 Changes Concerning Institutions – Chapter Entitled “The 
State” 
As a result of the new constitution institutions entrusted with fundamental rights 
protection were abolished, reshuffled and their powers were restricted. The curb-
ing of powers of the Constitutional Court, which played a prominent and deter-
mining part in the 1989 transition to the rule of law, best illustrates the nature of 
changes. Article 37 of the part on public finances stipulates that financial acts 
can be reviewed by the Constitutional Court only in connection with the right to 
life and human dignity, the protection of personal data, freedom of thought, con-
science and religion, or the rights related to Hungarian citizenship. This restriction 
of powers shall remain in force as long as the state debt does not drop below the 
half of the Gross Domestic Product. The fact that financial acts are not subject to 
constitutional control causes uncertainty in economic life, too. Individuals without 
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being personally affected by a legal rule can no longer turn to the Constitutional 
Court, this right is reserved for the President of the Curia (the Supreme Court), 
the Prosecutor General, the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, and one-
fourth of the Members of Parliament. Several Constitutional Court judges have 
been recently appointed (quite flagrantly, a former Fidesz politician and MP has 
been elected into the body) and judges are now elected for twelve years, i.e. 
three parliamentary cycles. According to Article 24 para. 5 “the Constitutional 
Court may review the Fundamental Law or the amendment of the Fundamental 
Law only in relation to the procedural requirements laid down in the Fundamental 
Law for its making and promulgation”, i.e. a new constitution or any modification 
of the present Fundamental Law cannot be subject to constitutional control.  
As opposed to the former constitution the Fundamental Law does not list the 
ordinary court levels. Under Article 26 para. 2 judges’ retirement age was low-
ered from 70 years to the general retirement age of 62 years. As a result, 274 
senior judges, among them 20 Supreme Court (renamed ‘Curia’) judges and 4 
presidents out of the 5 Regional Courts were forced to retire.49 The ECJ declared 
a violation of European Law on grounds of age discrimination violating Directive 
2000/78/EC on equal treatment in employment and occupation, which led to a 
compensation of judges, but only a few judges resumed their office.50 
In the course of the constitutional changes the mandate of certain elected 
heads of public institutions was terminated ahead of time. The Supreme Court 
was renamed Curia, the mandate of its President was terminated ahead of time, 
as was that of the members of the National Council of Justice, the body respon-
sible for the management of the courts. The President of the Supreme Court 
brought the case before the European Court of Human Rights, which ruled 
against the government of Hungary.51 Instead of the National Council of Justice, 
the President of the National Office for the Judiciary is entrusted with the central 
management of the courts, the President is supported by Vice-Presidents and an 
office. Article 27 para. 4 authorized the President of the NOJ to transfer any case 
to a court other than the one territorially competent to hear the case, as well as 
the Prosecutor-General to order to bring a charge before a court other than the 
competent one. It is hardly compatible with Article XXVIII of the Fundamental 
Law itself, under which “‘everyone shall have the right to have any charge 
against him or her, or his or her rights and obligations in any litigation, adjudicat-
ed within a reasonable time in a fair and public trial by an independent and im-
partial court established by an Act”. Some cases appearing to have been politi-
cally motivated have been subject to transferal. It was based, for example, on a 
decision of the President of the NOJ on 16 February 2012 that the case involving 
fictitious contracts concluded by the former vice mayor of Budapest and opposi-
tion party politician, Miklós Hagyó was transferred to the Tribunal of Kecskemét, 
though it surely did not make the provision of evidence easier for the former vice 
mayor. It is not surprising that in the case the ECtHR held that Hungary violated 
Article 5 para. 4. Upon pressure by the EU and international organizations the 
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Fifth Amendment eliminated the possibility of case transferal.52  
According to the 1989 constitution, the ombuds-institution is based on the 
conception of ombudspersons of equal rank, namely ombudsperson, specialized 
ombudsperson for data protection, specialized ombudsperson for future genera-
tions,53 specialized ombudsperson for national and ethnic minorities. The 1989 
constitution specified that Parliament can create ombudsman positions for the 
protection of any fundamental right, or interrelated fundamental rights, pertaining 
to sensitive social issues provided that their everyday violation threatens the 
freedom of citizens. The institutions of the minority and data protection and free-
dom of information ombudspersons served as guarantees for the implementation 
of relevant directives of the EU. This system was now replaced by the institution 
of one ombudsperson and its deputies, thereby the number of independent op-
ponents of the government were reduced. The ombudsperson for future genera-
tions and national minorities became deputies of the general ombudsperson, and 
with this reshuffle they lost their right to independent investigation. The ombud-
sperson responsible for the openness of public data and the protection of private 
data, lost its office ahead of time due to the Fundamental Law. In an infringement 
procedure, the CJEU decided that the way the position of the specialized om-
budsperson for data protection was abolished breached EU law.54 Later on the 
Minister of Justice apologised to former ombudsperson and he received a compen-
sation of 69 million HUF. However, as civil organizations legitimately protested, 
nobody apologised to Hungarian citizens and the institution itself was not re-instituted.  
Under Article 36 of the Fundamental Law the Hungarian government could 
impose special taxes as a result of failing to comply with EU Law or European 
human rights law. This implied that if, for example the ECHR ruled against the 
government of Hungary in a case, the government could have imposed the bur-
den of compensation on those whose human rights had been violated. The Fifth 
Amendment repealed this provision, however, the main point has not changed: 
the procedures against Hungary before the ECtHR regularly result in the Court’s 
ruling against Hungary, meaning that the government violated some fundamental 
rights, but these findings as well as measures taken by EU institutions are not 
followed by changes in the nature of the system. The compensation for violation 
of rights is ultimately imposed on the tax-paying citizens of the state.  
The government has increasingly committed itself to the majoritarian concep-
tion of democracy, meaning that nobody and nothing, not even independent 
state institutions can stand in the way of the will of the majority serving national 
interests.55 Following the restriction of powers of formerly independent state 
institutions, from August 2013 on steps were taken by the government together 
with state bodies against NGOs, including tax inspections and criminal proce-
dures, in the manner familiar from authoritarian states.56 
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C Conclusion 
This study examined the relationship between the national identity of the state 
and the protection of fundamental rights through the example of the Hungarian 
Fundamental Law. The Fundamental Law defines the ethnic concept of the nation 
as a Christian community and institutionalizes an outmoded national-historical 
approach with religious, devotional overtones. This concept of the nation cannot 
be reconciled with the moral equality of citizens which requires states not to favor 
or disfavor anyone on the ground of their conception of the good life.  
In the sense of the ideology of the Fundamental Law the preferred member of 
the Hungarian ethnic nation lives in a heterosexual marriage together with his or 
her spouse and their children, belongs to a traditional Christian community, does 
not confess his/herself a communist, and does not live in a public area. If some-
body follows moral principles other than this or is just simply not in the position of 
conforming to this expectation, the government can restrict according to the 
“nation’s will” their human rights in the name of the imagined “We”. The “nation’s 
will” serves as a trump card in public discourses and the Fundamental Law fol-
lows the interests of the government rather than moral values, and it in itself 
threatens constitutional democracy and leads to a constitutional tragedy. 
In spite of the fact that Hungary is an EU member state, it diverges from the 
values enshrined in Article 2 of TEU. Criticism by international and European 
organisations has not been followed by changes affecting the fundamental char-
acteristics of the newly setup constitutional system, which implies that the EU 
inadequately operationalises the concepts human rights, democracy and rule of 
law. 
